The objective of this article is to assess the impact of the new health financing reform in Georgia-'medical insurance for the poor (MIP)'-which uses private insurance companies and delivers state-subsidized health benefits to the poorest groups of the Georgian population.
Introduction
Georgia chose its own path in reforming the health financing system by allocating general government revenues to purchase relatively comprehensive coverage for those identified below the poverty line through a means testing system. The focus on the poor is a common feature of health financing reforms in other low-and middle-income countries (LMIC) (Preker et al. 2004; Jowett and Hsiao 2007; Leemput et al. 2007; Wagstaff 2007; Arfa and Achouri 2008; Meessen et al. 2008) . However, the Georgian experience is unique for two reasons. First, the Georgian government has chosen to provide more generous benefits to the poor than to other groups of the population. This is not a common practice globally, as, in most cases the wider welfare entitlements-including those for health-are directed towards the most organized or politically most powerful (Mkandawire 2005; Kutzin 2013 ), while people least likely to be covered are those with greater health care requirements needing financial protection from a publicly funded system (Meng et al. 2011) . Second, the coverage for the poor is purchased through competing private insurance companies. Only 11 countries out of 154 LMIC channel up to 10% of total health expenditure (THE) through private prepayment schemes, and for most of these countries private for-profit schemes are generally limited to the wealthy minority (Drechsler and Jütting 2005) . Columbia and India are the only other LMIC countries described in the literature that have established public private partnership (PPP) for insuring the poor (Miller et al. 2009; Basu 2010) .
There is a consensus that public financing of health care services for a population, and particularly for the poor, tends to be more equitable and can provide better financial protection (Glison et al. 2007 ; World Health Organization (WHO) 2010). However, global evidence is limited about using private forprofit insurance companies as financial intermediaries to provide health insurance for the poorest segments of population using public funds (Drechsler and Jütting 2005; Patouillard et al. 2007) . Our study primarily aims to evaluate the impact of medical insurance for the poor (MIP) to enrich the global body of evidence with the outcomes of using private insurance intermediaries to deliver public health care subsidies to the poor in Georgia.
Background
Georgia embarked on health sector financing reforms in 1995, when public financing for health plummeted after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. During the early days of the reforms, a social insurance model was introduced and funded by a mixture of payroll taxes and the general budget, while 'promising' universal entitlements to all. However, limited public financing-due to a weak economy and growing demand for health services-shifted the financial responsibility for health onto the patients, thus placing heavy financial burden on households. Consequently, in 2004, close to 80% of Georgia's THE was borne by the population (WHO 2011) and placed a disproportionate financial burden on the poor (Gotsadze et al. 2009 ). Out-of-pocket payments emerged as an impediment to accessing services (Gotsadze et al. 2005) . Financial access problems in turn led to a decrease in health service utilization, especially by the poor. By 2006, Georgia had one of the lowest health service utilization rates in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region, with less than 1.7 outpatient visits per person per year, and less than six hospitalizations and less than 1.6 surgical procedures per 100 people per year (WHO 2009) .
To remedy this situation, the government embarked on another round of health care financing reforms in 2006, and rather than offer universal coverage to all, a political decision was made to target limited public funds to the poor and offer better financial protection and improved access to disadvantaged groups of the population. The government developed and implemented a proxy-means-testing system that allowed the identification of poor households with a sufficient degree of certainty (Grosh et al. 2008; World Bank 2009) . This administrative system was used to deliver poverty cash transfers to households as well as health care benefits included in the MIP programme. The government launched the MIP in 2006 and all households registered in the poverty database with a poverty score below 70 001 were entitled to the MIP 1 . Between 2007 and 2008, the responsibility for purchasing medical care under the MIP was transferred from a single public purchaser 2 to multiple competing private insurance companies (Chanturidze et al. 2009 ). The government provided MIPeligible households a voucher that allowed families to choose an insurer of their preference, and the latter had no right to refuse coverage. The government paid the insurance company a fixed monthly capitated payment for every enrollee (adjusted for age group older than 65 and for regions) and allowed them to freely contract providers, although with some geographical access restrictions 3 . Those that did not qualify for the MIP were eligible for a basic 'universal package' of services offered throughout Georgia. The single public payer was still responsible for financing care under this 'universal package'.
AN IMPACT EVALUATION OF MEDICAL INSURANCE FOR POOR IN GEORGIA i3
In principle, the package consisted of various service guarantees, based on a mixture of specific diseases (e.g. oncology, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS etc.), services (e.g. emergency care) and target groups (e.g. children), which could be subject to copayments of 25-50% (Bauhoff et al. 2011) . However, the benefit package was neither clearly defined nor well understood by the population, and under-the-table payments were reportedly common, particularly at the hospital level, due in large part to historical underfunding of the 'universal' programme (Belli et al. 2004) . Thus, the eligibility thresholds became a dividing line between a single public purchasing agency covering a limited benefit package with significant co-payments for the general population, and multiple private insurers providing a more comprehensive benefit package without co-payments to the poor (Bauhoff et al. 2011) . The MIP offers a comprehensive benefit package regulated by the government to ensure uniformity across all insurance companies. Covered benefits include most emergency out-and inpatient care with few coverage limits and no co-payments, although the limits increased twice during 2007-10. Coverage for planned inpatient services is limited to $9000 (1 Gel¼ $0.6$), but has a negative list of services not included in the MIP. Planned outpatient visits-although free-include limited diagnostic investigations and laboratory tests that have to be prescribed by a family physician to be free. All other tests and diagnostics outside the MIP are subject to fee-for-service payment by the patient. Outpatient prescription drugs initially were not covered, but were added by 2010 although with a very limited choice 4 and with a very low annual limit of $30 and with 50% copayment (MoLHSA 2009). The reforms in health care financing were also accompanied by reforms in the supply side, i.e. primary health care establishments were refurbished and staff retrained using the World Bank loan. Most hospital facilities throughout the country were privatized, renovated and equipped using private capital. These investments had a positive impact on the quality of infrastructure, which by 2010 was not fully translated into quality improvements in service provision (Transparency International Georgia 2012) . Both public and private providers were allowed to enter into contract with private insurance companies and define the terms of service provision and payment. The government's involvement in rule setting for purchaser-provider interaction was minimal; however, regulations were explicit and strict about the content of the MIP benefits, about the terms of benefit delivery to patients and about the rights of the insured.
The objective of this article is to assess the impact of the MIP by looking at changes in access to essential health care services, and to examine the financial impact on costs borne by a patient. These, when considered together, are two key dimensions of universal coverage plans. To this purpose, we used data from the nationally representative Health Utilization and Expenditure Survey (HUES) conducted in 2007 (right at the beginning of the reforms) and in 2010 (MoLHSA 2011), and applied a difference-in-difference method of evaluation. Based on global evidence, provision of comprehensive coverage under the MIP was expected to reduce financial barriers to care, provide better financial protection to the insured poor and facilitate increased utilization of the covered services. This is the hypothesis we are trying to test, although involvement of private insurance intermediaries in the MIP may also have influenced these outcomes. In general, due to a reduced bureaucratic process and often better business practices, private intermediaries may be more efficient than public purchasers. However, the gains in efficiency may be outweighed by higher administrative and acquisition costs (Hanson et al. 2008) . Furthermore, evidence from another similar scheme Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) in India, suggests that private insurance intermediaries may be responsible for skewing the public resources from more cost-effective preventive and primary health care towards curative care and various abuses, such as delaying the issuance of membership cards to reduce the number of claims, thus curbing the utilization of health services by the beneficiaries (Balooni et al. 2012; La Forgia and Nagpal 2012) .
Methods and data
Our analysis uses a difference-in-difference methodology (Gruber 1994; Gruber et al. 1997 ) otherwise known as a prepost design with a control group. We compare the change (or difference) in the outcome variable(s), described later, at the baseline and follow-up of MIP implementation in the treatment group (MIP-covered individuals) and the control group ). This method has been suggested as preferable to pre-post comparison without a control group, because if a trend effect occurs during the same period as policy introduction/implementation, a simple pre-post comparison might incorrectly attribute the trend effect to a policy impact. In a difference-in-difference framework, any trend during 2007-10 affecting the treatment and control groups equally will be removed, and the resulting net difference will be the pure policy effect (Chou et al. 2003) .
In 2007, the government of Georgia decided to undertake a household survey entitled the HUES. This baseline survey was carried out during May-June 2007 and a follow-up was conducted in June 2010. This study uses data from both of these surveys to evaluate the impact of the MIP as they draw on a nationally representative sample of households, or approximately 3200 in each wave. For HUES 6 the national statistical office of Georgia used the exact same sample of households that had been interviewed during the same quarter in the Integrated Household Survey (IHS). The IHS is undertaken on a quarterly basis for living standards, poverty monitoring and other statistical purposes. Information about household consumption available from the IHS dataset was linked with the HUES allowing the researchers to link sickness, utilization and health expenditure data collected in the HUES with household consumption to provide a proxy for income. This is the basis for poverty measurement in Georgia. Although response rates in HUES surveys differed slightly-95% in 2007 and 89% in 2010, the number of cases obtained proved adequate for the purposes of our analysis. The survey questionnaire listed all household members and asked about current and past sickness episodes, including chronic diseases. It collected, separately, information on sickness and use of services and related household expenditures for all cases that occurred during the 30-day period before interview. For hospitalizations only, questions addressed all cases that occurred during the 12-month period preceding the interview. More details about HUES sampling, survey methodology and questionnaire are available (MoLHSA 2011). Table 1 illustrates the difference-in-difference methodology where 1 and 2 measure average out-of-pocket expenditure of the MIP insured per unit of service used and/or for a period (e.g. per hospital discharge, per outpatient visit or per month) during 2007 and 2010, respectively. c 1 and c 2 measure similar expenditures for the same periods but in the control group; Á measures the change in average expenditure within the MIP and Ác within the control group. The difference between Á and Ác thus removes the changes attributable to the trend effects, isolating the pure effect of the MIP.
Because our surveys were cross-sectional rather than panel, it was also necessary to account for individual characteristics that might have an effect on health care utilization and/or expenditures. Therefore, in the analysis all changes observed at the baseline and endline were further adjusted for individual characteristics (described below) in both groups.
Variables in use
To evaluate the impact of the MIP, we tested three sets of outcome variables in the regression model: (1) utilization of services; (2) level of out-of-pocket expenditures related to service utilization; and (3) odds of receiving free benefits without any co-pay. All these variables are self-reported and imply the usual limitations noted in the literature.
Utilization was measured by the following variables: (1) utilizing any services due to illness (including referring to selftreatment) during the 30-day period before the interview (coded as binary); (2) utilizing only formal health care services (for preventative and/or curative purposes) during the same period (coded as binary); (3) referring to self-treatment (coded as binary); (4) only outpatient service utilization (coded as both binary and continuous to account for number of visits); and (5) inpatient service utilization during the 1-year period preceding the survey (coded as both binary and continuous to account for number of hospitalizations for a given individual).
To measure out-of-pocket health expenditures five variables were selected: (1) average cost per outpatient visit, (2) monthly costs incurred for self-treatment, (3) monthly costs incurred for chronic disease management, (4) average cost per inpatient stay and (5) Finally, the third set of variables included receiving free outpatient and inpatient benefits separately, which were coded as binary variables.
The key independent variable to evaluate the effect of treatment was whether the respondent was enrolled in the MIP or not. For the difference-in-difference methodology, we also specified a time-related variable to account for the time between baseline (2007) and endline (2010) and also used a vector variable for observable individual characteristics. These included the following (all self-reported): (1) education level 8 ; (2) consumption level grouped into terciles 9 ; (3) age; (4) gender; (5) marital status; (6) household size; and (6) residence (urban or rural). Furthermore, individual level variables used in the model also included binary variables measuring perceived seriousness of illness, perceived individual health status and the presence of chronic disease. Tables 2  and 3 provide a list and summary descriptive statistics for the outcomes and independent variables used in this study.
Finally, we conducted a subgroup analysis looking at MIP impact within different population groups, organizing them by gender, age, urban-rural residence, income level and by regions. This allowed for more granularity in our analysis and helped better understand any impact that the MIP may have had on different population subgroups.
Using STATA Data Analysis and Statistical Software TM and the described variables we ran the difference-in-difference command to obtain the results below. Table 2 shows that government efforts to roll out MIP nationwide increased MIP coverage from 13.7 in 2007 to 21.9% in 2010. These findings are consistent with administrative data reported by the 'Social Service Agency' of Georgia (SSA 2010). With increased coverage the overall demographics of MIP-enrolled individuals did not change much, with the exception of two characteristics-the proportion of urban dwellers increased from 20 to 25.1% and the share of the poorest tercile grew from 45.7 to 49.4%, most likely at the cost of reduced coverage within the richest tercile. Table 3 presents summary statistics of the outcome variables, which suggest that MIP-covered individuals utilized services more and paid less out-of-pocket when compared with the control group. Also, those covered by MIP seemed more likely to receive free benefits. However, these findings were further tested with the help of difference-in-difference analysis to establish causality between MIP and observed benefits for covered individuals.
Study results
In Table 4 estimates of the MIP impact is based on single and double differences (i.e. with and without adjustment for individual characteristics). The single-difference estimator shows a statistically significant and positive impact of the MIP on utilization growth, expenditure reduction and on obtaining more free benefits. However, these estimates are likely biased by an unobservable individual characteristic. Consequently, when adjusting for the individual characteristic, the actual impact of the MIP is estimated, although the latter reduces the magnitude of the observed impact and reduces the statistical significance of our findings (P < 0.1). 
The results of double differences with adjustment in Table 4 show that MIP-enrolled individuals were marginally (by 2%) more likely to utilize any formal health care services (P < 0.1). Further analysis by population subgroups detailed in Tables 5  and 6 reveals an increase in the odds of utilizing any service by 2-4%, which occurred for individuals who were less than 44 years old (P < 0.01). Those from the middle consumption tercile with MIP coverage had a 5% higher odds of using formal sector providers and inpatient services (P < 0.05). At the same time, we observed a 2% reduction in the self-treatment rate among those in the poorest tercile and a 5% increase in odds in the richest tercile (P < 0.01). Further analysis of utilization reveals that residents of the capital city (Tbilisi) were more likely to benefit from an increase in the utilization of formal health care services by 12% (P < 0.01) and of inpatient services by 7.6% (P < 0.01).
Table 4 also shows that MIP helped reduce monthly selftreatment costs and monthly chronic disease management costs by almost 5 Gel (P < 0.05), and the average cost per inpatient stay by 227 Gel. The reduction in the overall monthly health spending for covered individuals was 27 Gel, although reductions had marginal statistical significance (P < 0.1). Furthermore, MIP-covered individuals were 18% more likely to receive free outpatient benefits (P < 0.01) and 14% more likely to receive free hospital treatment (P < 0.05) when they sought these services. The magnitude of this impact on self-treatment cost reduction was most pronounced for those between 15 and 64 years and among rural residents. Urban residents enrolled in the MIP spent 15 Gel less in monthly chronic disease management costs. Based on Table 6 reductions for out-of-pocket expenditures for outpatient visits [by 26.8 Gel (P < 0.01)] and for monthly health care costs [68.7 Gel (P < 0.05)] were more pronounced among the poorest tercile.
When looking at the probability of obtaining free outpatient and inpatient benefits by population subgroup, Tables 5 and 6 reveal that MIP-covered males, persons aged 45-64 and rural and Western Georgia residents all had 11 to 29% higher odds of obtaining completely free outpatient benefits compared with the control group (Table 5) . With regards to free inpatient benefits, analyses by gender, age and location did not reveal any major differences and all MIP covered individuals were 17 to 24% more likely to benefit (with the exception of: urban and Tbilisi residents and those in middle tercile). The odds of obtaining free inpatient treatment was highest-24% among the MIP covered 65þ year olds (P < 0.01). Table 6 shows that the MIP has benefited the poorest third of the population by increasing odds of obtaining free in-and outpatient services by almost 23%, although the statistical significance in the growth of outpatient service use was marginal (P < 0.1). The richest third also benefited, but only when seeking inpatient services. Finally, the residents in the capital city were more likely to use formal health care providers and inpatient services, but did not report benefiting from free services, contrary to the MIPcovered individuals residing outside the capital city, who had significantly higher odds of benefiting from free outpatient and inpatient services (Table 6 ).
Study limitations
Before discussing the study findings and presenting conclusions it is important to keep limitations in mind. First, the study is based on self-reported health problems and service utilization, an approach widely used in the similar evaluation work but which has specific limitations. Second, we have not looked at systemlevel costs and cost implications for providing MIP and channeling state subsidies through private health insurance, which is usually known to have higher administrative costs when compared with public purchasers. Third, inflation-adjusted prices were estimated using a conservative approach, by applying the overall consumer price index and not a health-specific inflation rate, which was significantly higher during this period. Consequently, the reductions in health care spending resulting from the MIP and recorded here could be understated and the magnitude of the impact could be greater. Fourth, the consumption terciles do not account for government poverty cash transfers to households, hence some households that would in reality be included in the 'poorest' tercile may have consumed more and were treated as relatively wealthier in our dataset. This may cause an underestimate of the impact on the poorest. However, using terciles instead of quintiles was seen as a preferred option. Finally, we have not accounted for supply-side factors, which probably influenced the impact on utilization rates.
Discussion
For the past decade, increasing access to health care services and reducing financial access barriers arising from out-of-pocket expenses was a policy priority for the government, and therefore 0.048*** *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01.
were implied policy objectives when initiating the MIP. The World Bank assessment of the MIP after an initial 6 months of implementation revealed that MIP beneficiaries were nine times more likely to utilize urgent care and that utilization increased among the poorest of the poor (Hou and Chao 2011) . However, these findings were not upheld by our study, which showed only a marginal (2%) increase in overall service utilization among the MIPcovered individuals, which was also statistically marginally significant. Such findings are consistent with the effects of the MIP found by other studies (Bauhoff et al. 2011) . However, subgroup analysis did show that utilization growth was significant among the capital city residents, who benefited from a 12% increase in odds of formal health service utilization and 7.6% for hospital service use, as compared with their peers in the control group (P < 0.01). However, comparable results were not achieved in other parts of the country. Increased hospital service use found in our study is consistent with findings from India's RSBY scheme and thus may be attributed both to flaws in the MIP benefit package design (see further) and to the influence of private intermediaries as in the case of RSBY (Planning Commission of India 2011). Additionally, the negligible impact on overall utilization with varying geographical results in utilization growth among the MIP insured cannot be fully explained in this study because of: (1) the study limitations; (2) the complexity of supply-demand interactions in health care markets that were not fully controlled in our regression model; and (3) possible corporate motivations of the providers and insurers, described later. Consequently, the lack of a pronounced countrywide impact on utilization and concurrent significant growth in service consumption among the capital city residents could be due to following factors: (a) Tbilisi enjoys a better health care infrastructure and more health-related human resources that can deliver better quality services relative to other parts of the country. This may have motivated the MIP insured in Tbilisi to seek more care compared with their peers in the regions. However, other studies in Georgia noted that between 2007 and 2010 geographical access to health care improved significantly, including in rural areas and the availability of medical staff also increased (MoLHSA 2011). Therefore, supply-demand interactions require closer consideration in future when similar studies are undertaken. (b) The residents in the capital city may enjoy better access to information and therefore better awareness about the benefits included in the MIP. Bauhoff et al. (2011) reported that after the MIP transition to private insurance companies beneficiaries reported difficulties in obtaining information about their benefits from the insurers. Another factor compounding the information barrier was reported by United Nations Children's Fund UNICEF (2011) when they found that the language barrier for non-ethnic Georgians residing in certain regions of the country was a significant impediment in seeking MIP coverage and/or services. Consequently, such information barriers imposed by insurers or arising from language differences may have affected the use of health care services differently in the capital and in the regions outside of the capital. (c) Barriers could have been imposed by private insurance companies to reduce number of claims and effectively manage utilization and moral hazard. Delays exceeding 6 months in issuing the insurance cards to the insured by private insurance companies were reported, particularly in the regions outside of the capital (Chamber of Control of Georgia 2011)-tactics similar to those employed by private insurance companies participating in India's RSBY scheme (Rajasekhar et al. 2011 ). Bauhoff et al. (2011 reported on difficulties to obtain reimbursements from insurers faced by the MIP insured. Another survey by Transparency International also reported cases where insurance companies withheld information and/or imposed barriers on beneficiaries when they sought care (Transparency International Georgia 2012). It is possible that dealing with such barriers and/or handling insurance claims with private insurers could be relatively easier in the capital, due to close proximity of insurance offices and the proximity of the insurance mediation service for the MIP (established by the government), consequently offering better chances to overcome bureaucratic barriers when they appear. Because we were not able to account for all these influences on service utilization in our study our findings cannot be conclusive about the impact of the MIP on utilization; however it certainly raises questions, especially related to the behaviour of private insurers as managers of public subsidies for the poor. It is obvious that these issues need further exploration in order to inform policy responses.
The overall impact of the MIP on out-of-pocket expenses was consistent in its direction. In all instances it reduced costs to the covered individual. The largest reduction was observed for inpatient spending-at 227 Gel per case. Although most financial impact indicators for the overall sample revealed marginal statistical significance (P < 0.1) with the exception of a monthly self-treatment cost that declined by 5.3 Gel (P < 0.05) and a monthly chronic disease cost reduced by 15.3 Gel-but only for urban residents-reductions were sizable: e.g. inpatient expenditures were &33% less compared with the mean cost of hospitalization (MoLHSA 2011) and reductions in monthly health spending amounted to 15.8% of the national per-capita monthly consumption for 2010 10 (GEOSTAT 2013).
The greatest and most statistically significant financial impact of the MIP was observed among the poorest tercile, where average cost per outpatient visit declined by half compared with the national average in 2010 (P < 0.01), and the average cost per hospitalization was reduced by 65% (P < 0.1) (MoLHSA 2011). Reductions in monthly health care costs among the poorest amounted to 40% of per-capita average monthly consumption (P < 0.05) (GEOSTAT 2013). All of these figures suggest that the poorest third received the greatest financial benefits from the MIP. However, such impact might be attributable more to the means testing and the targeting system for poor, and less to the MIP.
Finally, the MIP increased the odds of obtaining free benefits by those covered individuals that used services. This increase was more pronounced among the poorest population for outpatient treatment as well as among the poorest and residents of Western Georgia, who were almost 18-23% more likely to obtain free outpatient care when accessing this service. And finally, the odds of obtaining free hospital benefits were marginally significant in the overall sample. However, the subgroup analysis revealed a statistically significant increase in odds of obtaining free hospital treatment for the poorest and among the residents of rural areas, Eastern and Western regions that reported higher odds by 22.8, 20, 18.8 and 21.9%, respectively. A higher prevalence of obtaining free inpatient services relative to outpatient services may indicate that inpatient benefits in the MIP are more generous when compared with outpatient ones. Therefore, content and attractiveness of the benefits in the MIP need further research to create a more people-centered benefit package better tailored to populations' health needs and to facilitate service utilization under the MIP.
Conclusions and policy implications
Universal health coverage (UHC) has been set as a possible umbrella goal for health in the post-2015 development agenda (Vega 2013) . Although many countries are far from attaining universal health coverage, all countries can take steps in this direction (Kutzin 2013) . As stated earlier, Georgia had 'UHC' entitlements before 2006 but without providing real financial protection and/or secured access to services to its population. The MIP was the first step of the government to move away from a declarative 'universal entitlement' towards improving access to services and providing greater financial protection, at least to the poorest. However, starting from late 2012 the government included children under 5 and adults over 65 in the insured pool. Thereafter, from mid-2013 the government embarked on the UHC objective and expanded the MIP-type benefits to every citizen of Georgia. This path towards UHC, through combining several publicly financed schemes with different entitlements (in this case a basic 'universal package' for the general population and a more generous MIP benefit package for the poor), and gradually expanding the coverage to the general population, has been successfully tested in such countries as Thailand (Hanvoravongchai 2013) and Turkey (Menon et al. 2013) . In light of these decisions our study provides valuable evidence that could help shape new policies to better achieve its stated goals.
First of all, this study documented that after 3 years of the MIP implementation the programme successfully managed to reduce financial access barriers to care and afforded completely free in-and outpatient benefits to a sizable part of the MIPcovered individuals.
Second, the MIP had a positive impact on improving equity among Georgian citizens by delivering greater financial benefits to the poorest while the benefits were similar to all enrolled. Therefore the equity impact of the MIP most likely arises from the reform design, i.e. focusing greater resources and offering more comprehensive benefits to the poor, as well as creating an effective targeting mechanism for the government. Consequently, it seems essential to retain the focus on the poor, and to offer greater benefits, while rolling out UHC and enrolling every citizen in the scheme, especially when an administrative mechanism to detect and reach the poor is in place and functions effectively. Otherwise there is a risk that the wealthier may benefit most.
Third, based on the available evidence (Spaan et al. 2012) , the logical outcome of such developments should have been an increased utilization of services. However, the MIP did not facilitate any growth in utilization, although progress appeared in certain geographic markets. As we pointed out, the reasons for the varying impact of the MIP on utilization could be numerous, ranging from service supply, public awareness of the MIP and its benefits, provider responsiveness, and especially private insurer behaviour that could have used strategies to reduce claims, and managing utilization, etc. Our study is not able to offer conclusive findings; however, understanding why the MIP failed to facilitate service utilization remains the question to be answered. Uncovering underlying causes will be critical to inform the government when deciding on how to grow service utilization and to retain or not private insurance intermediaries for going forward.
